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The wars in Korea and Vietnam were of a piece, directly related by virtue of U.S. global strategy and China’s security concerns. This
paper, focusing mainly on the U.S. side in these wars, argues that three characteristics of American policy had enduring meaning for the
rest of the Cold War and even beyond: the official mindsets that led to U.S. involvement, the centrality of the China threat in American
decision making, and the common legacy of intervention against nationalism and in support of authoritarian regimes. It is part of a
continuing Asia-Pacific Journal series on the Korean War on the sixtieth anniversary of its outbreak.
The Korean War was the seminal event of the Cold War in Asia. By invoking containment of communism to deal with the outbreak of war on the peninsula,
the United States carried the Truman Doctrine into Asia. Japan became the key U.S. military ally in Asia, Chinese intervention in Korea sealed U.S.-China
enmity for the next thirty years, and Korea stayed divided without a peace treaty. At one and the same time, war in Korea drew Asia into the orbit of vital U.S.
interests and strengthened the U.S. commitment to Europe’s primacy.1 The war rigidified ideological positions and ensured that the East-West geopolitical
struggle would go on for many years. As importantly, the ensuing big-power confrontation in Vietnam, in which the United States and China tangled by proxy,
represented a straight line from Korea. These two conflicts directly or indirectly enveloped nearly all of Asia, forcing governments to choose sides in the Cold
War competition.
This paper will argue that the importance of the Korean and Vietnam wars goes beyond their strategic connection. The official mindsets that led to U.S.
involvement, the centrality of the China threat in American decision making, and the common legacy of intervention against nationalism and in support of
authoritarian regimes were all features of U.S. policy throughout the remainder of the Cold War in Asia. But not only then or there; after the Cold War,
nationalist identities and U.S. internationalist ambitions collided repeatedly in other parts of the world.
Korea: The “Globalization of Containment”
President Truman’s containment speech of March 1947, though focused on the Mediterranean, not Asia, nevertheless prefigured the U.S. response to Korean
events in June 1950. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized, even if Soviet advances in Greece and Turkey were thwarted, the USSR “may decide to
accelerate expansion in the Far East, in order to gain control of those areas which outflank us in the Near and Middle East.”2 A consistent Cold War principle
was thus established: the interconnectedness of global events—falling dominoes, in short. Containing presumed Soviet moves in southern Europe was of a
piece with containment in Asia.
During the next two years U.S. policy came to embrace the idea that the so-called Yalta system—built on the assumption of post-war U.S.-Soviet cooperation
—was no longer viable. In the Pacific that meant converting Japan into a security partner, with a bilateral peace treaty dependent on Japanese consent to the
establishment of major U.S. military bases for the indefinite future, and secret arrangements for U.S. ships carrying nuclear weapons.3 This “revival of
Japanese militarism,” as the Chinese would call it then and later, invited a communist response, which came in the form of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Mutual
Assistance (see below) in February 1950. The treaty specified that the Soviet Union would come to China’s aid in the event of an attack by Japan “or any
other State which should unite in any form with Japan in acts of aggression.” Thus was the Cold War line in the sand drawn, precluding Japanese neutralism
in foreign policy and early normalization of relations with the PRC.
The next major benchmark in the evolution of the Cold War in Asia was NSC-68, a secret study commissioned by President Truman and submitted for his
approval in April 1950. The study provided the essential ideological dimension to U.S. policy.4
This document, perhaps the most important statement of U.S. grand strategy in the entire Cold War, clarified that global instability, “even in the absence of
the Soviet Union,” required a major U.S. military buildup and an activist response to Soviet machinations. NSC-68 had its internal critics—George Kennan, for
instance, thought it wrong to establish national security strategy by way of doctrine—but it was a consensus document that provided benefits for all the
players, notably the U.S. military. Yet it is important to understand that NSC-68 and other NSC studies around the same time, such as NSC 48 (1949), went
beyond containment and recommendations for U.S. rearmament.
Of equal importance was the objective to preserve the global economic system that Bretton Woods had created—a liberal trading order in which U.S. exports
could thrive and U.S. financial supremacy could be sustained.5
Ideologically, NSC-68 was the predictable outgrowth of an administration-wide conviction that the communist threat was global in scope, monolithic in
structure, and largely “schematic” (Kennan’s word) in intent. The declassified NSC studies of China are of a piece with public statements by U.S. leaders in
seeing little to distinguish the China threat from the Soviet threat—though with the exception that NSC experts did note the potential for Sino-Soviet
differences to emerge.6 But on the whole, Kennan’s early warnings about Stalin’s foreign policy—warnings whose alarmist language he would later regret7—
found a receptive audience in Washington, and were easily transferable to concerns about a communist China.
On the eve of the Korean War Chinese leaders had reached the same kinds of conclusions about “U.S. imperialism” that U.S. leaders had reached about
China: an implacable threat, headed by people who would never agree to treat China on the basis of “equality and mutual benefit.” The combination of
Chinese communist suspicions and anger over U.S. support of Chiang Kai-shek, on one hand, and Patrick Hurley’s accusations of pro-communist sympathies
among Foreign Service and State Department officers who served in China or on the China Desk, on the other, effectively closed the door on the possibility
of finding common ground. Truman spoke of reaching out to Chinese “liberals” instead of to Mao’s inner circle, an erroneous choice that further contributed to
putting off the day when U.S.-China relations could be normalized. Thus, well before war broke out in Korea, chances for U.S. recognition of China became
The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus
In-depth critical analysis of the forces shaping the Asia-Pacific...and the world.
Full text of NSC-68 is available here.
Map indicates stages in the US-Korean War 1950
extremely small.8 Mao’s only realistic option was to “lean to one side” and drive the best
bargain he could—the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance, long understood as the
last of China’s unequal treaties.
Although we now know that the North Korean invasion of the South was the subject of
intense bargaining among the three communist countries’ leaders, and that Chinese
intervention in support of the North was by no means preordained, Truman’s inner circle
was surely unaware of such details. Even if they had been known, it is doubtful that
they would have led to a decision by the president not to intervene in Korea. The
thinking behind NSC-68, and (as Glenn Paige’s account makes clear) the small number
of people involved in the Korean decisions,9 virtually assured U.S. intervention in Korea
—no matter Dean Acheson’s “perimeter speech,” the warnings of U.S. military and
civilian officials about the looming Korean “volcano” of civil war,10 Congressional
reluctance to provide economic assistance to the ROK, or Kennan’s concern that a
communist threat in the East would draw attention away from the main threat in the
West. As Truman would recall, the first images that came to his mind when he got word
of North Korea’s crossing of the 38th parallel were of Munich, Manchuria, and Ethiopia.11
Given the American political scene—pressures from the Republican right wing and the
onset to McCarthyism—Truman was not about to risk charges of being soft on
communism.12
In making his historic commitment to South Korea’s defense, Truman was not merely
responding to a communist probe of the West’s weak spots, as some U.S. officials
initially thought. For the United States, the decision was considered a “test case.” The
“test” was conceived by the president and his chief advisers as having three
dimensions: opposition to communist aggression wherever it occurred (an extension,
therefore, of the Truman Doctrine in Europe); preservation of the collective security
system under the United Nations; and no appeasement.13 Thus, the reputation of the
United States as a dependable ally was believed to be on the line.14 The Korean
decision was made with considerable concern about security issues, including protection
of Japan and Taiwan; but no one questioned the correctness of intervening. Yet the
Korean War, after all, was a civil war as much as it was an international war, a clash of
contending Korean nationalisms brought on by the U.S.-Soviet decision at the end of
World War II to divide the country. But the debate among Truman’s inner circle never
entertained such matters; nor did it address the nature of the government the United
States became committed to defending. Nor, finally, did U.S. leaders consider Korea’s
intrinsic value—its culture and history—separately from its place in the global contest
with the Soviets.15
What was important for American leaders about Korea was its derivative value. It could
have been anywhere, said Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk; the U.S. response
would have been the same.16 It was a moral conflict as much as a strategic one. This
unchallenged perspective facilitated the miscalculations and misperceptions that would
follow.17 Vietnam would fall into the same category—a country of no particular
importance to U.S. national interests when considered in isolation, yet somehow “vital”
to protect nonetheless in the context of the Cold War. Hence Korea marked the initial
step in the globalization of containment, as Robert Osgood wrote,18 and Vietnam would
be the second. These conflicts set the stage for global interventionism, on the
assumption that the communist menace had become worldwide in scope and that
Chinese aggressiveness was the Asian component of a full-fledged Moscow-directed
assault on the West.
The Chinese were surely motivated by an immediate sense of threat. After all, they believed they had earlier withstood U.S. intervention in their civil war with
the KMT. Though hesitant to make a commitment to defend North Korea without assurances of full Soviet support—the final decision was not made until
October 4-5, 1950—the PRC leadership viewed the possibility of a U.S. occupation of the entire Korean peninsula and Taiwan as sufficient reason to
intervene.19 The fact of U.S. entry into North Korea was decisive; it threatened China’s own security and the socialist revolutions in both countries.20 Mao
reasoned that whether or not China prevailed against U.S. forces, China simply had to act; otherwise, not merely its security but also its prestige would
suffer, “and the American invaders will run more rampant, and have negative effects for the entire Far East.”21 In the end Beijing, just like Washington, felt a
moral as well as a security imperative to go to war.22 Yet in both cases, leaders underestimated the opponent’s will and misunderstood its motives.23
China and the United States could each claim victory in the Korean War, since their
Korean allies had been successfully protected. But that was hardly the whole story, for
both had failed in their larger strategic objective, which was to deter future interventions
elsewhere in Asia. For the United States, moreover, war in Korea had become a sharp-
edged political issue, with Republicans charging that Truman’s limited-war doctrine was
immoral and Truman’s joint chiefs of staff answering that a wider war to “win” in Korea
would have been (in General Omar Bradley’s famous words) “the wrong war, at the
wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.” Thus, for the United
States, limited victory in Korea—stalemate in fact—surely contributed to seeing Vietnam
as the inevitable next stop for containment. Indeed, by the time the Korean armistice
was signed in 1953, the first of several U.S. administrations (Dwight Eisenhower’s) had
already committed to preventing the extension of communism in Asia.
Vietnam: A Second Test
Numerous explanations of “why Vietnam?” have emerged since the war ended in 1975.
Bureaucratic explanations have been popular: “groupthink” in high-level decision making;
presidents’ hopes not to lose the next election; conditioned behavior in response to
crisis. Other analysts have focused on presidential hubris, the politics of escalation, the
Emperor Bao Dai
imperial presidency, concern about the U.S. reputation, and the excessive influence of the military, among many others. Common to many of these
interpretations is American hegemony: the belief among U.S. leaders that the nation was being tested again, and that leadership of the Free World demanded
a major commitment to winning lest the communist world prevail in Southeast Asia and beyond.
War in Vietnam preoccupied every U.S. president from Roosevelt to Ford. Each of them, and their top advisers, subscribed to the basic idea that while
Vietnam was not intrinsically important, it had increasing symbolic meaning for America’s power position in the world. As one reads the basic documents—the
NSC strategic assessments from 1950 on, the presidential papers, and the Pentagon Papers collection among others—one finds Vietnam moving inexorably
to center stage in U.S. global strategy. At first this evolution was a function of war in Korea: While the Americans were engaged in Northeast Asia, it
behooved the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to support the French effort in Indochina. The two wars were interlinked, and the French were viewed
as America’s proxy in the common struggle to stem the communist tide. Once an armistice was arranged in Korea, Vietnam became America’s war for the
next twenty-five years, first in ongoing support of the French, then (following the Geneva Conference in 1954 that divided Vietnam) in replacement of them.
US aid for France in Indochina charted in Pentagon Papers.
The United States, particularly the State Department’s Far Eastern desk,24 certainly had misgivings about supporting French colonialism and France’s choice
of a Vietnamese leader (Emperor Bao Dai) who, like Syngman Rhee, had long lived outside his country. Bao Dai, moreover, was widely regarded as a colonial
puppet; he, like other leaders in Saigon in the years to follow, would never be able to claim the nationalist mantle that Ho Chi Minh held. But Ho, after all, was
considered another Mao, not another Tito; his communism mattered far more (to Acheson and the State Department’s European desk) than his Vietnamese
nationalism.25 U.S. recognition of Bao Dai’s government in February 1950 thus followed Chinese and Soviet recognition of Ho’s the month before. Moreover,
whereas Korea’s independence was never a contested issue, Vietnam’s (as well as Cambodia’s and Laos’) was. France’s constant postponement of grants of
independence to the three colonies was another source of U.S. irritation. Nevertheless, U.S. presidents consistently placed such reservations second to
strategic assessments that called for ever-larger investments of money and then troops to fight “Soviet imperialism.”
Following on Truman’s commitment to intervention in Korea, U.S. military support, which eventually accounted for around 80 percent of France’s war costs,
began to flow into Vietnam. Accompanying the flow was an escalating perception of threat.26 NSC 48/1 (December 1949) spoke of the need to contain
communism in Indochina. NSC 64 (February 1950) linked events in Indochina to “anticipated communist plans to seize all of Southeast Asia,” recited the
domino theory, and recommended that “all practicable measures be taken to prevent further communist expansion in Southeast Asia.” Reflecting the outbreak
of war in Korea, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of December 1950 considered direct Chinese intervention in Indochina “imminent.” NSC 48/2
(December 1950) repeated that concern in calling for U.S. economic and military assistance against “threats from Communist aggression, direct or indirect . .
.” NSC 124/2 (June 1952) also put the China threat at center stage, warning that “the danger of an overt military attack against Southeast Asia is inherent in
the existence of a hostile and aggressive Communist China.” And NSC 5405 (January 1954) considered defense of Indochina the “keystone of the defense of
mainland Southeast Asia except possibly Malaya.”
These and other official assessments prophesied that the loss of even a single country to communism would be the beginning of a political and economic
disaster for U.S. interests. Consequently, whereas before Korea, the security community’s advice to the president was to support the “Bao Dai solution” and
sustain the French war effort, after Korea—and as the French effort began to fail—the United States was looking for ways to contain a presumptively Chinese
threat and prevent a negotiated capitulation to Ho Chi Minh’s forces. Thus, NSC 5405 rejected any political solution, including a coalition government in
Vietnam, and instead stated: “It will be U.S. policy to accept nothing short of a military victory in Indo-China.”27
But it did. The United States was forced to swallow what the NSC called a “disaster” in Vietnam, the
agreement reached at the Geneva Conference to divide the country at the seventeenth parallel. From there
on, it was U.S. policy to replace the French, prevent the holding of national elections called for in the
Geneva Accords because of the certainty of Ho Chi Minh’s victory, and go about “nation building” with yet
another absentee leader who lacked nationalist credentials, Ngo Dinh Diem. But efforts to “reform” his and
successor governments failed just as they had in South Korea and in Vietnam under French rule.
Constantly thwarted by corrupt and ineffectual South Vietnamese leaders, the Americans felt perfectly
justified in promoting coups and giving the green light (in the case of Diem and his brother) to
assassinations, again to no avail.28
The second Vietnam War revealed a peculiarly American penchant for relying on military solutions. At one
level was counter-guerrilla warfare to “win the hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese people. Under Kennedy,
this effort was shaped by the conviction that communist organizers in the countrysides of the Third World
were no more than “scavengers of the modernization process.” “Communism is best understood as a
disease of the transition to modernization,” said Walt Rostow in a much-publicized speech.29 If guerrilla
warfare, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s “military arm,” could be defeated in Vietnam, Rostow
proclaimed, there would be no more Cubas, Congos, or Vietnams. Kennedy clearly agreed.30
At some point, however, it became evident that counter-guerrilla tactics were not working. In a briefing of
top officials, General Maxwell Taylor said: “The ability of the Viet-Cong continuously to rebuild their units
and to make good their losses is one of the mysteries of this guerrilla war. . . . Not only do the Viet-Cong
units have the recuperative power of the phoenix, but they have an amazing ability to maintain morale.”31
Taylor evidently did not consider anti-foreign nationalism much of an explanation. After 1964, U.S. strategy
leaned more on force at a second level: the unprecedented bombing of both North and South Vietnam. Here
there was considerable internal confusion and bickering about what bombing was supposed to accomplish—
breaking Hanoi’s will? Destroying North Vietnam’s industrial capabilities? Improving morale in the South?—but no lack of enthusiasm for the task itself. Yet no
amount of military firepower proved capable either of defeating or demoralizing the enemy, or uplifting the South Vietnamese military and civilian leadership.
The U.S. response to clear indications that military measures of any kind and dimension were failing to produce victory speaks directly to the hegemony
thesis. By 1965, the argument of some of Lyndon Johnson’s advisers for continuing the bombing strategy (now called “sustained reprisal”) had turned to
“setting a higher price for the future upon all adventures of guerrilla warfare . . . ” Even though “the odds of success [by bombing] . . . may be somewhere
between 25% and 75%,” bombing would at least make Hanoi’s plans more expensive.32 To this argument was added the idea that what was really at stake,
even in failure, was America’s reputation:
It is essential—however badly SEA [Southeast Asia] may go over the next 1-3 years—that U.S. emerge as a “good doctor.” We must have
kept promises, been tough, taken risks, gotten bloodied, and hurt the enemy very badly. We must avoid harmful appearances which will
affect judgments by, and provide pretexts to, other nations regarding . . . U.S. policy, power, resolve and competence to deal with their
problems.33
US Special Forces and Montagnard troops
in Vietnam
There were, of course, top advisers such as Walt Rostow and the Joint Chiefs of Staff who persisted in believing that more bombing would produce the
desired results. But what the above excerpts reveal
is that lost faith in bombing did not end it; rather,
bombing became a show of national resolve,
essential for the next time. The key national interest,
John McNaughton (a top adviser to Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara) would say in the same
memo just quoted, was no longer about saving
Vietnam. U.S. aims were now
70%--To avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to
our reputation as a guarantor).
20%--To keep SVN [South Vietnam] (and
the adjacent) territory from Chinese hands.
10%--To permit the people of SVN to enjoy
a better, freer way of life.34
If the dominoes were not to keep falling, reputation
was the key and displays of staying power were
essential to that reputation. As Rostow would argue,
the United States could still achieve its objectives in
Vietnam “if we enter the exercise with the same
determination and staying power that we entered the
long test on Berlin and the short test on the Cuba
missiles. But it will take that kind of Presidential
commitment and staying power.” While
acknowledging “anxieties and complications on our
side of the line,” what mattered most to Rostow—
and, he had every reason to believe, to everyone
else in the Kennedy-Johnson administrations—was
the “limited but real margin of influence on the
outcome which flows from the simple fact that at
this stage of history we are the greatest power in the
world—if we behave like it.”35
Reputation, test case, hegemony—every president
concerned with Vietnam bought into the validity of
these ideas and determined somehow to make the
most of a war they knew was being lost. By the time
the war had become “Johnson’s war,” it was
increasingly evident to the president that victory was
eluding him. Notwithstanding his tough public words,
Johnson privately sharply questioned his military and
civilian advisers about why and how they thought the
United States could win in Vietnam. In one meeting
he specifically wondered whether “Westerners can
ever win in Asia” and while fighting side by side with
a “government [that] changes every month.” Maybe
the United States should “make our stand
somewhere else?” he offered.36
But at that meeting and in conversations revealed after his death, Johnson succumbed to the logic of “national security.” He had grave and growing doubts:
“the biggest damn mess I ever saw,” he said on one taped conversation with McGeorge Bundy in the Oval Office. “I don’t think it’s worth fighting for, and I
don’t think we can get out.” In another conversation with Senator Richard B. Russell, a close friend, Johnson admitted that “We’re in the quicksands up to our
neck, and I just don’t know what the hell to do about it.” Johnson worried about sending young men to die and about being impeached for being “soft on
communism.”37 Thus, he fell back on the anti-communist zeal that had always worked for presidents, with Congress and with the public. Johnson simply saw
no alternative to deeper involvement.
And what of the Chinese?38 Having been a strong supporter of Vietnam’s revolution against the French—mainly in the form of advisers and military aid—
China reacted to U.S. escalation in the mid-1960s in much the same way as in Korea: It considered the threat to Vietnam equivalent to a threat to the PRC’s
own security. Chinese leaders told their Vietnamese counterparts that they would send troops if requested—and in the end, China did dispatch about 320,000
troops, though none for combat. But at the same time, and contrary to the Korean experience, Mao and other conveyed to Washington that it did not want a
war with the United States—messages that Washington reciprocated. Though there were aerial incidents that might have led to direct Sino-American conflict,
both governments took steps to prevent it. U.S. troops never entered North Vietnam, and the U.S. government never publicized the fact that Chinese troops
were there. “One can say,” a Chinese scholar has written, “that the two sides established initial trust during the confrontation.”39
Conclusion
There are several remarkable similarities in the U.S. and Chinese experiences in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Leaders in both countries considered the
outbreak of fighting important tests of will and credibility. The conflicts were assessed as threats to national security that demanded a strong response for
moral reasons as well. Beneath the surface domestic politics in both China and the United States also compelled intervention. Still, despite the view in both
Washington and Beijing that each was the main enemy in the wars, they took steps to keep the wars from expanding into China, and in the U.S. case from
resorting to (though considering) use of nuclear weapons.
But while U.S. leaders are to be commended for rejecting total war and improving crisis communication with China by the 1960s, decision making in other
respects left much to be desired. Among the most important deficiencies revealed in the course of U.S. decision making on the two wars was the tendency to
fall back on what Morton Halperin has called “shared images”: axioms of foreign affairs supposedly learned from earlier experiences in dealing with the
communist world. Among them are “no appeasement,” “peace is indivisible,” the unique U.S. responsibility for defense of the Free World, and the primacy of
military strength to achieve national security.40 Stereotypical thinking, and the misapplication of lessons supposedly learned from other conflicts,41 blinded
U.S. decision makers (and probably decision makers in the USSR and China too) to the particular historical, political, and cultural conditions that they faced in
Korea and Vietnam.42 They also kept decision makers from challenging official truths and proposing alternatives. Were these conflicts tests of U.S. will? Was
the USSR pulling the strings? Was the domino principle valid? Did U.S. policies contribute to bringing on or prolonging the war? Were there nonviolent
opportunities to end the war? Unfortunately, history overpowered calculation, as Ernest May has concluded.43 Of course it did not help matters that in the
1950s Asia experts in the State Department and other government agencies—people who might have asked the impertinent questions—had been sidelined by
the McCarthyist purges. Those few who were left to challenge U.S. policy, such as George Ball in the State Department, were given a hearing but were
invariably outnumbered and often castigated for not being “team players.”44
Military approaches to fundamentally political solutions to these wars ensured a future of seemingly insatiable demands by the Pentagon for more money,
weapons, and manpower. No cost was too great when national security was determined to be at stake. The wars in Korea and Vietnam, and other U.S.
interventions that followed, set a pattern of high military spending that continues to the present wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.45 The pattern reflects consistent
Pentagon resistance to lowering weapons procurement, redefining missions and objectives, or reevaluating threats. Rather, the thrust of the Pentagon’s
planning is to build on prior budgets, weapons acquisitions, and threat analyses.
U.S. involvement in Vietnam deviated from Korea in a number of respects, principal among them being its unilateral character. President Truman took the
Korea issue before the UN—and, thanks to the absence of the Soviet representative, secured Security Council approval—and eventually received troop
support from a number of countries. He could thus claim that intervention was legitimate, both in terms of repelling North Korean aggression and defending
the South Korean government and people. But Vietnam was a largely unilateral effort; though various countries (including South Korea) contributed, the war
from first to last was a matter of American decision.46 Of course, in both cases the issue of legitimacy was not entirely resolved: Truman never asked
Congress for a declaration of war, or even consulted with Congress beforehand; and (with the exception of Eisenhower’s informal but critical consultations
with key members of Congress on Vietnam in 1954) no president brought Congress into discussion of policy making. Moreover, the support the United States
received from other countries in both wars never impacted U.S. decision making. A “coalition of the willing” always presumed U.S. leadership. The “imperial
presidency” and U.S. unilateralism were thus born in these wars; we have witnessed the survival of these trends most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan,
despite the fact that since 1973 a War Powers Resolution has been the law.47
“Limited war” is another legacy of Korea and Vietnam. Presidents throughout were disposed to “minimax” strategies: seeking maximum gains with relatively
smaller investments. Of course the sacrifices of blood and treasure were very large in both wars, and in terms of destructiveness, these wars were anything
but limited. Yet presidents withheld uses of force that would have created even larger and more destructive conflicts, such as by carrying the war into China,
committing still larger numbers of ground troops, bombing large cities and ports, and using the atomic bomb. All presidents thus had to endure political flak for
not fighting to win despite their use of extraordinary firepower: General MacArthur’s accusations after Truman fired him would be just the beginning of
presidential troubles when fighting for anything less than complete victory and allegedly interfering with the professional military’s right to conduct hostilities as
it sees fit.
In limiting U.S. objectives in Korea and Vietnam to deterrence and defense, however, the aims of policy were not met. The United States saw Korea still
divided and a North Vietnamese takeover of the South. Moreover, U.S. presidents presided over the expansion of both wars in other directions. Vietnam
became an extension of the Korean War, at least in the minds of U.S. leaders; and the war in Vietnam engulfed both Laos and Cambodia. In Cambodia, the
Nixon administration’s preference for military action rather than acceptance of Prince Sihanouk’s version of neutrality led to the overthrow of the government
and the start of a nightmarish reign of terror under the Khmer Rouge. Thus, large-scale U.S. interventions accomplished defense of South Korea, but at the
cost of constant inter-Korean tension, a long-term U.S. military presence there and in Japan, and postponement of normal relationships with Vietnam, China,
and North Korea.48
It might be objected that in the context of the Cold War, presidents and their top advisers had limited options: Intervention in Korea and Vietnam was
unavoidable for both domestic and international reasons. After all, the Soviet Union and its allies appeared to be on the march; if they weren’t stopped, it was
irresponsible not to take action to stop them—and politically risky as well. (LBJ thought he would be impeached if he pulled U.S. forces out of Vietnam; and
not being “the first president to lose a war” was the first rule of presidents involved in one.) Hindsight only obscures the real-world choices that faced leaders
who had witnessed the Soviets clamping down on Eastern Europe. These leaders therefore had every reason to presume and anticipate aggressive
communist behavior in Asia.
But while these are reasonable counter-arguments to nonintervention, they inadvertently make the very point I conclude with based on the case studies.
American administrations are consistently faced with unpalatable choices because of their prior commitment to being global policeman. They misinterpret the
circumstances of the time—the communist threat, the terrorist threat—as requiring a crusade rather than considering each situation from the standpoint of
that country’s own history and nationalist identity. U.S. leaders often argue that leadership of the Free World is thrust upon them, and that “history” has
chosen the United States to bear the greatest burdens. In reality, the notion that America is destined to lead, and moreover is beneficent and non-imperial in
leading, forms part of the mythology that justifies interventionism.49 “We are the indispensable nation,” as Madeleine Albright once put it. President Obama’s
Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech continues this tradition.
The trap of “national security” has been acknowledged by none other than Robert McNamara. His memoirs list eleven lessons that should be learned from
Vietnam, perhaps the most important of which is the following:
We did not recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are omniscient. Where our own security is not directly at stake, our judgment
of what is in another people’s or country’s best interest should be put to the test of open discussion in international forums. We do not
have the God-given right to shape every nation in our own image or as we choose.50
Yet even here we see how a general guideline can easily be overwhelmed by events. Precisely where and when “our own security” is at stake is, in the end, a
matter of judgment, and no president is going to put the issue “to the test of open discussion,” not in Congress and certainly not in “international forums.”
Instead, national security issues will be judged as they have always been judged—by a handful of (mostly) men around the president, people who share his
world view and who have always believed in American globalism.51
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